While scientific inquiry crucially relies on the extraction of patterns from data, we still have a far from perfect understanding of the metaphysics of patterns—and, in particular, of what makes a pattern real. In this paper we derive a criterion of real-patternhood from the notion of conditional Kolmogorov complexity. The resulting account belongs to the philosophical tradition, initiated by Dennett :27–51, 1991), that links real-patternhood to data compressibility, but is simpler and formally more perspicuous than other proposals previously defended in (...) the literature. It also successfully enforces a non-redundancy principle, suggested by Ladyman and Ross, that aims to exclude from real-patternhood those patterns that can be ignored without loss of information about the target dataset, and which their own account fails to enforce. (shrink)

This textbook is a flexible and affordable collection of classic and contemporary primary sources in philosophy. The readings cover seven basic topics of Western Philosophy. The selections are long enough to present a self-contained argument but not so lengthy that students lose track of the main point. Each reading has an outline with study questions, questions for reflection and discussion, and an annotated bibliography. The book includes a glossary and an appendix on logic and argumentation.

It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different modalities. Jones (2015) has recently argued that this system has many features (such as being modular) which are characteristic of sensory systems. Additionally, he affirms that traditional sensory systems also process inputs from different modalities. This suggests that (...) the ANS is a perceptual system and therefore it is not problematic for the grounded view. In this paper, I defend the amodal approach to the ANS against these two arguments. In the first place, perceptual systems do not possess the properties attributed to the ANS and therefore these properties do not imply that the ANS is perceptual. In the second place, I will propose that a sensory system only needs to be dedicated to process modality-specific information, which is consistent with responding to inputs from different modalities. I argue that the cross-modal responses exhibited by traditional sensory systems are consistent with modality-specific information whereas some responses exhibited by the ANS are not. (shrink)

La clase de filosofía, desde la perspectiva del docente, no debe considerarse como una mera actividad transeúnte o predicamental. El presente estudio quiere examinarla, siguiendo la metafísica de la vida de Tomás de Aquino, como una obra vital, que requiere, por un lado, que el profesor se haga una sola cosa —una sola vida, podemos decir— con la doctrina que va a explicar y, por el otro, que esta intelección actual, sin movimiento alguno, dé lugar a la «concepción» y al (...) «parto» de lo entendido en una palabra del corazón, la cual, por su dinamismo intrínseco, tiende, a su vez, a manifestarse exteriormente en una palabra sonora, en un «verbum vocis». Esta exteriorización, por la cual aquella íntima operación que constituye la vida del que filosofa se corporeiza en forma de «diálogo», es, precisamente, la clase de filosofía. La técnica pedagógica debe tener en cuenta el orden intrínseco por el cual la vida humana, mediante la formación de una palabra del corazón, procede a su propia perfección, y no debe olvidar que el perfeccionamiento vital del profesor es causa (instrumental) del perfeccionamiento vital del alumno; es decir, quien no «produce», quien no «engendra», quien no «crea» interiormente lo que está explicando —independientemente de si se trata o no de una novedad— difícilmente ofrecerá unos medios adecuados para que el alumno conciba y dé a luz, en la intimidad de su mente, a un «verbum cordis». (shrink)

Los seis textos que se incluyen a continuación contienen una breve reflexión sobre cuestiones de metafísica. A pesar de la diversidad de las temáticas, hay en todas ellas una mirada que les confiere «un aire de familia», a saber, la «mirada metafísica»: «Espiritualidad y religiosidad en Simone Weil», de Natán Verdés; «Metafísica de la psicodelia», de Gerard Masmitjà; «La relación trinitaria en la realidad cosmoteándrica de Raimundo Pánikkar», de Francesc Xavier Marquès; «Introducción a la teología analítica seguida del ejemplo del (...) colapso modal en el teísmo clásico», de Constantí Cabestany; «Metafísica: la ciencia que no avanza», de Albert Piguillem; y «Memorias del subsuelo: un breve análisis filosófico», de Andreu Cacho. (shrink)

Si prescindiéramos de la composición acto-potencial entre «essentia» y «esse» en la línea del ente creado, necesariamente nos veríamos arrojados al monismo spinozista, esto es, a admitir que solamente hay una substancia (a) única, (b) infinita, (c) increada, (d) necesariamente existente, (e) acto puro, (f) identificada, en último término, con la misma substancia de Dios. En el capítulo LII del segundo libro de la Summa contra gentiles, Santo Tomás obtiene esos atributos divinos a partir de siete argumentos que tienen como (...) objetivo probar que, en el caso que no se aceptara la diferencia real entre essentia y esse en el ente finito —tanto material como inmaterial—, necesariamente deberíamos reconocer que sólo hay una substancia con los seis atributos anteriormente mencionados (cada argumento da lugar a un atributo distinto, exceptuando los dos primeros que desembocan en el mismo, a saber, el de la unicidad). En el artículo presente, siguiendo la interpretación de Norberto del Prado, nos proponemos exponer cómo puede refutarse el monismo spinozista desde la doctrina de Santo Tomás en dos etapas: la primera viene representada por el ya citado capítulo de la Summa contra gentes; la segunda, por la cuarta vía (Summa Theologiae, I, q.2, a.3). (shrink)

It is widely recognized that police performance may be hindered by psychophysiological state changes during acute stress. To address the need for awareness and control of these physiological changes, police academies in many countries have implemented Heart-Rate Variability biofeedback training. Despite these trainings now being widely delivered in classroom setups, they typically lack the arousing action context needed for successful transfer to the operational field, where officers must apply learned skills, particularly when stress levels rise. The study presented here aimed (...) to address this gap by training physiological control skills in an arousing decision-making context. We developed a Virtual-Reality breathing-based biofeedback training in which police officers perform deep and slow diaphragmatic breathing in an engaging game-like action context. This VR game consisted of a selective shoot/don’t shoot game designed to assess response inhibition, an impaired capacity in high arousal situations. Biofeedback was provided based on adherence to a slow breathing pace: the slower and deeper the breathing, the less constrained peripheral vision became, facilitating accurate responses to the in-game demands. A total of nine male police trainers completed 10 sessions over a 4-week period as part of a single-case experimental ABAB study-design. Results showed that eight out of nine participants showed improved breathing control in action, with a positive effect on breathing-induced low frequency HRV, while also improving their in-game behavioral performance. Critically, the breathing-based skill learning transferred to subsequent sessions in which biofeedback was not presented. Importantly, all participants remained highly engaged throughout the training. Altogether, our study showed that our VR environment can be used to train breathing regulation in an arousing and active decision-making context. (shrink)

John Venn and Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) created systems of logic diagrams capable of representing classes (sets) and their relations in the form of propositions. Each is a proof method for syllogisms, and Carroll's is a sound and complete system. For a large number of sets, Carroll diagrams are easier to draw because of their self-similarity and algorithmic construction. This regularity makes it easier to locate and thereby to erase cells corresponding with classes destroyed by the premises of an (...) argument, a particularly difficult task in Venn diagrams for more than four sets. Carroll diagrams can represent existential propositions easily, so they are capable of clearly representing more complex problems than Venn's system can. Finally, both Carroll and Venn diagrams are maximal, in the sense that no additional logic information like inclusive disjunctions is able to be represented by them. Carroll's logic diagrams and logic trees constitute his visual logic system. (shrink)

One of the most prominent ethical concerns regarding emerging neurotechnologies is mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and to the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. A key issue is whether this information needs more stringent protection than other kinds of personal information. I will articulate and support the view, underlying recent regulatory frameworks, that mental privacy requires a special treatment because (...) of its relation to relevant aspects of personal identity. It has been suggested that this approach could be supported by the idea that mental privacy constitutes a fundamental psychological dimension of privacy. The connection between this psychological view of privacy and identity can be traced back to Irwin Altman’s idea that privacy is an interpersonal boundary regulation process. However, it is not clear whether this notion of privacy can be associated with a conception of identity that is relevant in contemporary neuroethics. I will suggest that the narrative and relational approach to identity, a prominent view in recent ethical discussions of neurotechnology, lines up with key aspects of Altman’s proposal. I suggest that if mental privacy is an essential component of identity, the latter could be affected by technological mind-reading. (shrink)

Our knowledge about colonial philosophical manuscripts preserved in the «Fondo Antiguo» and «Fondo Varios» at the National Historical Archive is limited almost exclusively to its listing and location. In some cases, there is a very brief description of the contents, identification of their philosophical tendency and some information about their authors. In order to expand our knowledge about them, we have tried here, on the one hand, to provide a more detailed description of the contents of the works, and, on (...) the other hand, to systematise the information provided by different catalogues. For this work, the contents of the original manuscripts and the corresponding microfiche have been revised and described. Thus, we have been able to correct some errors concerning location and content. We therefore hope to contribute, even minimally, to the construction of the history of philosophy in Chile. (shrink)

The paper introduces a special issue of the journal Philosophical Problems in Science (ZFN) on the topic of the nature and norms of scientific explanation.

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion (...) for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate. (shrink)

Charles L. Dodgson's reputation as a significant figure in nineteenth-century logic was firmly established when the philosopher and historian of philosophy William Warren Bartley, III published Dodgson's ?lost? book of logic, Part II of Symbolic Logic, in 1977. Bartley's commentary and annotations confirm that Dodgson was a superb technical innovator. In this paper, I closely examine Dodgson's methods and their evolution in the two parts of Symbolic Logic to clarify and justify Bartley's claims. Then, using more recent publications and unpublished (...) letters, I argue that Dodgson approached the elimination problem in class logic differently than his contemporaries, and in doing so, anticipated several important concepts and techniques in automated deductive reasoning. These materials also provide additional insight into his reasons for writing this book. (shrink)

Abstract:I defend that the distinctive object of our aesthetic evaluation of films is the full emotional experience, taken as a unified whole, that we go through as we watch a film and that I call the viewer's film emotional life. The aesthetic value itself—the positive quality we perceive in the experience of having had a certain film emotional life—is in the significance we experience in that film emotional life insofar as it contributes to the discovery and the exploration of the (...) viewer's human and individual emotional nature. I finally suggest that the explanation of the positive felt quality of such experience is in the progress it represents regarding our resourcefulness as emotional subjects toward the realization of our individual ideal of life. (shrink)

Since the application of Postulate I.2 in Euclid's Elements is not uniform, one could wonder in what way should it be applied in Euclid's plane geometry. Besides legitimizing questions like this from the perspective of a philosophy of mathematical practice, we sketch a general perspective of conceptual analysis of mathematical texts, which involves an extended notion of mathematical theory as system of authorizations, and an audience-dependent notion of proof.

Este artículo analiza los aspectos fundamentales de la teoría del conocimiento expuestos en el curso dictado por fray Juan de Fuica (OFM), en 1689, en el Colegio San Diego de Alcalá (Santiago de Chile). Presentamos primero una breve descripción de los Comentarios filosóficos del fraile, volumen en el que se incluyen los Comentarios Acerca del alma sobre el que centraremos nuestro estudio. Luego, analizamos la doctrina del conocimiento ad mentem Scoti expuesta en este manuscrito inédito, testimonio exclusivo de la enseñanza (...) filosófica de la época. El principal aporte de este trabajo es visibilizar parte del patrimonio filosófico colonial del país, lo que permitirá futuras investigaciones en esta área de la disciplina. (shrink)

El artículo ofrece, en un inicio, algunos aspectos biográficos novedosos de la vida de Manuel Antonio Talavera, un teólogo paraguayo y abogado de la Real Audiencia que enseñó filosofía en Chile a finales del siglo XVIII. Luego, se presenta la transcripción de parte del curso de filosofía natural (De corporibus coelestibus) preparado para los alumnos del Real Convictorio Carolino de Santiago de Chile. Hasta ahora, Talavera es conocido sobre todo como el primer cronista de la Independencia de Chile. Por ello, (...) hacemos público por primera vez de manera íntegra un trabajo suyo relativo a su actividad docente en aulas santiaguinas, con lo que descubrimos también su condición de filósofo en Chile durante el fin del período colonial. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Although much has been written on Descartes’ thought on animals, not so much has originated in, or has taken full account of, Descartes’ views on emotions. I explore here the extent to which the latter can contribute to the debate on whether he embraced, and to which extent, the doctrine of the bête machine. I first try to show that Descartes’ views on emotions can help offer new support to the skeptical position without necessarily creating new tensions with other central (...) aspects of his philosophy. And second, I sketch the type of theory of animal passions which Descartes could have accepted. The general conclusion I draw is not that Descartes did not hold the view of the bête machine but rather that we can find within his thought a solid stream of ideas, which became stronger towards the end of his life, that points in the opposite direction. (shrink)

Film emotions are genuine emotions whose formation and development is affected by conflictive factors. Whereas their arousal, similar to that of real-life emotions, is disproportionately strengthened by the cinematographic medium, their subsequent course is both weakened and interrupted. Their objects, which I view as members of our personal emotional world (not in terms of their supposed fictionality, as often assumed), are also proper intentional objects of emotions: our fear is about the shark on the screen, our pity about the main (...) character. This view allows also for an explanation of two of film emotions’ neglected features: (a) the viewer's emotional attachment and empathy toward film objects and (b) the long-lasting emotional impact films can have on viewers. (shrink)

I argue that our everyday evaluations of architecture are primarily evaluations of spaces and, in particular, of their inhabitability— that is, whether they serve or can serve to the realization of our individual ideal of life. Inhabitability is not only a functional criterion but an aesthetic one as well. It is aesthetic insofar as the evaluations about inhabitability include evaluations about the quality of the experience of actually doing something in —or simply occupying—a particular space. This aesthetic aspect of our (...) everyday evaluations explains, on one hand, the distinctive features of our everyday preferences for some architectonic spaces over others—namely, their very personal nature; their noticeable value in our daily lives; their inseparability from the activities we plan to realize in those spaces; and the importance of the spaces which are contiguous to the one we are evaluating. And on the other, it both reveals architecture’s significance for the quality of our daily life and serves as a guide for us to choose spaces that improve that quality. (shrink)

Although it has been argued that mechanistic explanation is compatible with abstraction, there are still doubts about whether mechanism can account for the explanatory power of significant abstract models in computational neuroscience. Chirimuuta has recently claimed that models describing canonical neural computations must be evaluated using a non-mechanistic framework. I defend two claims regarding these models. First, I argue that their prevailing neurocognitive interpretation is mechanistic. Additionally, a criterion recently proposed by Levy and Bechtel to legitimize mechanistic abstract models, and (...) also a criterion proposed by Chirimuuta herself aimed to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanation, can be employed to show why these models are explanatory only under this interpretation. Second, I argue that mechanism is able to account for the special epistemic achievement implied by CNC models. Canonical neural components contribute to an integrated understanding of different cognitive functions. They make it possible for us to explain these functions by describing different mechanisms constituted by common basic components arranged in different ways. (shrink)

The current human rights framework can shield people from many of the risks associated with neurotechnological applications. However, it has been argued that we need either to articulate new rights or reconceptualise existing ones in order to prevent some of these risks. In this paper, we would like to address the recent discussion about whether current reconceptualisations of the right to mental integrity identify an ethical dimension that is not covered by existing moral and/or legal rights. The main challenge of (...) these proposals is that they make mental integrity indistinguishable from autonomy. They define mental integrity in terms of the control we can have over our mental states, which seems to be part of the authenticity condition for autonomous action. Based on a fairly comprehensive notion of mental health (ie, a notion that is not limited to the mere absence of illness), we propose an alternative view according to which mental integrity can be characterised both as a positive right to (medical and non-medical) interventions that restore and sustain mental and neural function, and promote its development and a negative right protecting people from interventions that threaten or undermine these functions or their development. We will argue that this notion is dissociated from cognitive control and therefore can be adequately distinguished from autonomy. (shrink)

I defend Christopher Peacocke's and Robert Hopkins's experienced resemblance accounts of depiction against criticisms put forward by Gavin McIntosh in a recent article in this journal. I argue that, while there may be reasons for rejecting Peacocke's and Hopkins's accounts, McIntosh fails to provide any.

Dominic McIver Lopes’ Four Arts of Photography and Diarmuid Costello’s On Photography: A Philosophical Inquiry examine the state of the art in analytic philosophy of photography and present a new approach to the study of the medium. As opposed to the orthodox and prevalent view, which emphasizes its epistemic capacities, the new theory reconsiders the nature of photography, and redirects focus towards the aesthetic potential of the medium. This symposium comprises two papers that critically examine central questions addressed in the (...) two books, with responses by the two authors in defence of their respective positions. (shrink)

En este libro, que se titula «Sobre los nombres divinos [De divinis nominibus]», siguiendo la costumbre de aquellos que han transmitido la ciencia magistralmente [artificiose], Dionisio empieza, en primer lugar, presentando algunas consideraciones necesarias para todo el estudio sucesivo, y, en segundo lugar, prosigue exponiendo el objeto principal [de su tratado] en el capítulo tercero.

This paper asks: What is philosophy and what are some current challenges and future prospects for pursuing and teaching it? What role can and should students’ imagination, interests, and circumstances play in addressing these challenges and prospects? It argues, first, that there are at least six senses of the term “philosophy”: the personal, social, branch of inquiry, theory, school of thought, and wise sayings senses; second, that a variety of stimuli contribute to motivate philosophy in all of its senses. Third, (...) it argues that teaching philosophy involves not just teaching one or more philosophies historically held, nor just partially or totally defending one or another of these philosophies; but also engaging in the third sense of “philosophy” above listed: philosophy as a branch of inquiry. Finally, the paper argues that by relying on the interests of philosophy learners that match the stimuli motivating philosophy, philosophy teaching sensitizes philosophy learners to the grounds that make this investigation viable and promising, and motivates them to engage in it. (shrink)

Lewis Carroll: Logic Charles L. Dodgson, 1832-1898, was a British mathematician, logician, and the author of the ‘Alice’ books, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There. His fame derives principally from his literary works, but in the twentieth century some of his mathematical … Continue reading Lewis Carroll: Logic →.

Lewis Carroll: Logic Charles L. Dodgson, 1832-1898, was a British mathematician, logician, and the author of the ‘Alice’ books, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There. His fame derives principally from his literary works, but in the twentieth century some of his mathematical … Continue reading Lewis Carroll: Logic →.

O presente artigo procura debater se é possível pensar o campo político a partir de Descartes. Em geral se considera que: 1) o tema teria sido praticamente ignorado por Descartes; 2) há indicações do que o filósofo pensa a respeito dessa temática, quer em sua correspondência, quer ao longo de seus trabalhos. Nossa posição se aproxima da segunda alternativa, pois Descartes teria conferido um lugar ao campo político por meio das implicações e desdobramentos relativos à união da alma e do (...) corpo. Mais especificamente, por meio do papel da causalidade final para a ação prática do ser humano, seja na moral, seja na política. Nesse sentido, os conceitos discutidos no _ Tratado das paixões _ e na correspondência com a princesa Elisabeth podem ser elucidativos. Dessa maneira, nossa leitura é a de que emerge em Descartes um campo político baseado no exercício da razão e de uma vontade livre. (shrink)

O presente artigo procura desvelar como Pascal e a abordagem psicanalítica, em sua vertente freudiana e lacaniana, pensaram a experiência de um ser humano finito diante de uma situação paradoxal. Com efeito, as propostas da psicanálise e de Pascal, embora separadas por mais ou menos dois séculos, apresentam pontos comuns que talvez ajudem a elucidar suas próprias posições. Nesse cenário, a hipótese que discutimos a seguir é a de que tanto Pascal quanto a psicanálise tecem suas categorias a partir de (...) uma observação atenta do comportamento do homem que procura compreender o porquê de uma constante sensação de vazio marcar a experiência humana. Assim, nossa investigação será realizada por meio, de um lado, do cotejo dos conceitos pascalianos de divertissement e de graça com, de outro lado, as ideias metapsicológicas de das Ding, de representação, de pulsão e de fantasia da psicanálise. (shrink)